Third down may be the “money down,” but what about the first two downs?
I’m not sold on teams being “good” on third downs. I don’t think that depending on keeping drives alive by converting on third down often is a good, repeatable way to effectively move the ball downfield.
To put it another way, bragging that your team is great on third down might also be saying that your team isn’t good enough on first and second down.
So, I decided to take a look at how the Gators performed on offense on first and second down, or what I’ll refer to as “early downs.” To do this, I’ll once again use Expected Points Added (EPA), which basically uses a variety of factors like down, field position and distance to measure efficiency. I’m also adding something called success rate, which is what percentage of plays resulted in a positive EPA.
UF’s biggest strengths offensively were its wealth of talented, experienced wide receivers and a quarterback who was really good at throwing the ball with anticipation. That played out on the spreadsheets as well.
Florida had the second-highest success rate through the air on early downs in the SEC and the third-highest EPA per dropback. Quarterback Kyle Trask was lethal in these situations.
However, UF was notably awful at running the ball on first and second down. Running the ball on first down is predictable, and the Gators were abysmal at it anyway.
Florida was by far and away the worst team at running the ball on early downs in the SEC. No one had a worse EPA or success rate at running the ball on first or second down. Coach Dan Mullen should have just given his team three downs instead of four when he decided to run the ball on first or second down.
One of my other problems with running the ball often on early downs is that you can put your offense in some bad spots and not help your quarterback at all, especially when you can’t run the ball in the first place. You run the risk of falling behind and forcing a pass play on a long third down, which isn’t a great idea when you have to start your backup quarterback for most of the season.
Now, because Mullen is pretty good at making adjustments to his offense, he made a big change midseason: Ditch the run game. Below, you can see how often the Gators called passing plays versus running plays on early downs in each game.
There’s a pretty seismic shift starting with the Auburn game. It ranges from fairly even to borderline air raid-esque for the rest of the season. By the end of the regular season, Mullen ignored the run game on early downs the same way a sixth-year senior ignores his schoolwork.
But did that shift in playcalling affect the Gators?
Not really.
Arguing if establishing the run actually means anything is for another time, but the Gators’ running game was pretty consistently bad all year.
The passing attack was still pretty good despite how much Florida’s offense depended on it. The results are a little skewed because of two cupcakes and a Tennessee squad that played like one in September, but some of Trask’s best performances came when he had a heavier workload. He had very good games against LSU and Missouri while dropping back a combined 56 times on early downs.
The black line here is the median passing EPA per play this season for Florida. I used the median here instead of the mean because the Tennessee game was such a large outlier.
In five of its last eight games, the Gators’ passing attack on early downs was around or above average despite a pitch count that would impress Brady Singer.
Oddly enough, Florida’s matchup against Virginia in the Orange Bowl didn’t make any sense. The running game that was nonexistent all year suddenly exploded for over seven yards a carry overall in what was by far the Gators’ best game on the ground. Florida had a .686 EPA per rush against the Cavaliers.
To put that into perspective, it was only one of two games that it had a positive EPA per rush all season, and the Gators had just three games where their EPA per dropback was higher than its rushing performance against Virginia. And they did this despite having one of their worst performances through the air on early downs all season.
Conclusions
I think the biggest takeaway from the exercise is that Mullen did a great job adjusting his offense to its strengths, which meant relying on throwing the ball early and often. When running the ball on first or second down is essentially burning a down, you have to look for other ways to move the ball. To Mullen’s credit, Florida’s offense continued to perform well, even when throwing the ball was its only option.
Also, it’s pretty much forgotten by now, but the Gators did all of this with their backup quarterback. We’re talking about a two-star quarterback coming out of high school who hadn’t started a game since he was a freshman in high school. In the SEC, that should have been a death sentence.
Instead, Mullen adapted his offense around a lackluster offensive line, a running game that was equivalent to just bashing your head into a wall multiple times and an inexperienced quarterback. When you have all of that but a wealth of weapons at wide receiver, it only makes sense to just throw the ball more.
None of that is what comes to my head when I think of a traditional Dan Mullen offense. But, things could return to normal next season.
Florida returns much of its offensive line, a position that relies heavily on experience. Throw in the emergence of sophomore Ethan White toward the end of last season and the addition of Mississippi State grad transfer Stewart Reese, and the Gators could end up patching their biggest hole on the roster.
Overall, Florida’s success through the air on early downs significantly boosted an offense that scored 33.2 points per game and was one of the best in the SEC. UF’s struggles on the ground were immense, but it wasn’t enough to drag down the unit that much. It may not have been what Mullen imagined it would be at the beginning of the season, but the Gators’ offense was still very efficient on early downs.
Follow Brendan on Twitter @Bfarrell727 and contact him at bfarrell@alligator.org.
