This past October, we witnessed a stark readjustment of the U.S. military agenda in the Middle East. On Oct. 30, President Obama announced the U.S. military would, in fact, be putting "boots on the ground" in Syria. Earlier on Oct. 15, the Obama administration announced an extension of the timeline for U.S. military presence in Afghanistan. Through most of next year, 9,800 troops will continue operations, and by Jan. 2017, a residual force of 5,500 troops will remain indefinitely.
One does not have to go very far back in time to find statements from the White House promising that neither of these two commitments would be engaged. As recently as Dec. 2014, Obama declared, "Our combat mission in Afghanistan is ending." In the case of Syria, from the moment the U.S. began its airstrike venture in 2014 to this past Sept. 30, the White House continually reassured there would not be "boots on the ground" in Syria.
Yet, we have seen a complete reversal of strategy on both fronts. What happened?
Engagements in Syria are likely the result of converging factors. Recent reports conclude that the Islamic State group is currently as strong as it was in 2014. Moreover, U.S. programs designed to "train the moderates" have proven lackluster. The initial CIA program only successfully and thoroughly trained a handful of soldiers. Subsequently, a similar Pentagon program, totaling $42 million, fell through because it was directed solely against ISIS, while most rebels want to fight al-Assad as well. In summation, the U.S. strategy of training moderates and engaging airstrikes has fallen short of desired expectations.
Likewise, al-Assad’s reutilization of chemical weapons against civilians and rebels through the use of chlorine canisters and Russia’s recent intervention in the region, largely in support of al-Assad, has inspired more active U.S. involvement. In describing the new agenda, however, the White House resists admitting these "fewer than 50" special-ops troops will likely see combat, stubbornly maintaining that they will exclusively pursue "advise-and-assist" engagements.
On Afghanistan, Obama announced, "Our troops will continue to pursue those two narrow tasks that I outlined earlier: training Afghan forces and going after al-Qaida." Commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan Gen. John Campbell cites the recent resurgence of the Taliban threat as necessitating a considerable U.S. presence. Given the rise of ISIS after the 2011 American retreat from Iraq and recent skirmishes in Afghanistan between spreading ISIS forces and the Taliban, Obama maintains that Afghanistan is "a key piece of the network of counterterrorism partnerships that we need." Many Afghan officials and police strongly advocate a continued U.S. presence as well.
So, will these new U.S. strategies prove successful? I don’t know. I think the bigger question is, particularly in the case of Syria, what does success truly mean? Success for whom?
On an optimistic note, world leaders from a myriad of countries, including the big players in Syria — Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Russia and the U.S. — met Oct. 23 in Vienna to discuss future action. Overall, they agreed on the need for united efforts against ISIS, and delegates told the press they discussed "even the most difficult (issues)." The diplomats agreed to meet again, and, judging by the first meeting’s optimistic end, perhaps something constructive will emerge.
As for the revised U.S. strategy in Afghanistan, all that can really be said is our engagements will not likely end soon. And seeing as how the U.S.-Afghan war now enters its high-school aged stage, with the engagement having begun way back in October 2001, we may, unfortunately, be seeing this war through to graduation day.
David Hoffman is a UF history and physics sophomore. His column appears on Tuesdays.
